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State v. Vandiver: Whither Judicial Discretion Under
the North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act?
It has been said that "[a]side from the determination of guilt or innocence,
selecting an appropriate sentence is perhaps the most important decision to be
made in the entire criminal justice system."' In any given jurisdiction, power to
make this decision is distributed among legislators, judges and correctional officials. Each actor exercises discretion within a statutory framework and acts to
check abuses by other participants in the sentencing process. 2 In North Carolina, an important area of discretion reserved to the judiciary is the application
of aggravating or mitigating circumstances to impose a criminal sentence different from the presumptive term established by statute for a particular crime. A
sentencing judge "may consider any aggravating and mitigating factors that he
finds are proved by the preponderance of the evidence, and that are reasonably
related to the purposes of sentencing."' 3 Perjury by a criminal defendant while
testifying at trial is recognized as a valid aggravating factor in a majority of
jurisdictions. 4 Until recently, North Carolina was a member of that majority. 5
The North Carolina Supreme Court held in State v. Vandiver,6 however, that
perjury "may no longer constitute a nonstatutory aggravating factor in North
'7
Carolina."
This Note examines the court's reasoning in Vandiver as well as the common-law and statutory contexts in which the decision was made. This Note
concludes that the North Carolina Supreme Court erred in its holding in
Vandiver and proposes an alternative standard that would allow trial courts to
consider perjury by a criminal defendant as an aggravating factor in sentencing
while minimizing the potential for abuse and due process violations.
On December 28, 1985, Robert E. Scott was visiting his mother and stepfather, Shirley and Joseph Haselden. 8 The Haseldens lived in an apartment on the
second floor of a rooming house in Fayetteville, North Carolina. 9 At approximately 6:45 p.m., the Haseldens, Scott, and another resident of the house, Gregory Davis, went downstairs to the apartment below to complain about loud
1. DIVISION OF PROBATION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 1 (Publication 105 1984) [hereinafter PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION].
2. See C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 295-96 (1978).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1988).

4. For a jurisdictional survey of the use of perjury as an aggravating factor insentencing, see
Annotation, ProprietyofSentencing Judge's Considerationof Defendant'sPerjury orLying in Pleas or
Testimony in Present Trial, 34 A.L.R. 4TH 888, 891-900 (1984). See also infra note 141 (listing cases
from various jurisdictions).
5. See State v. Thompson, 310 N.C. 209, 227, 311 S.E.2d 866, 876 (1984), overruled, State v.
Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988).
6. 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988).
7. Id. at 574, 364 S.E.2d at 375.
8. Id. at 570, 364 S.E.2d at 373.
9. Id.
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music coming from it. 10 Mildred Vandiver, the defendant, lived in the apartment that was the source of the noise, and it was her boyfriend, Paul Hair, who
answered the door when the Haselden party knocked.' Hair began "yelling
and cursing" and became embroiled in an argument with Scott. 12 When Scott
asked Hair to turn the music down, Hair responded, "make me . . . white

boy."' 3 At this point Vandiver came to the door and "profanely ordered" Scott
and Davis not to bother Hair. 14 Davis and Joseph Haselden returned to their
respective apartments, Shirley Haselden remained on the stairs, and Scott continued to argue with Hair.' 5 Testimony differed as to what occurred next.
Shirley Haselden testified that as she stood at the base of the stairs across
16
from Vandiver's door, Hair said, "Go ahead and do it if you're going to."
According to Mrs. Haselden, Vandiver then entered the hallway, shouted
profanities and stabbed Robert Scott with a butcher knife.' 7 The knife severed
Scott's carotid artery, and he bled to death.18
Mildred Vandiver testified on her own behalf and denied that she stabbed
Scott. 19 Vandiver stated that after the others had returned upstairs, Scott entered her apartment and slapped her. 20 She testified that Hair, carrying a steak
knife, followed Scott out of the apartment. 2 1 Vandiver claimed not to have seen
the actual stabbing. She testified that when Hair returned, the couple left the
apartment to go to the store and visit friends. 22 Vandiver also testified that Hair
told her to take the blame for the stabbing because the police would not do
23
anything to a woman.
Vandiver was convicted by a jury of murder in the second degree, 24 a Class
C felony 25 with a presumptive term of imprisonment of fifteen years. 26 Under
the provisions of the North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act, 27 the trial judge must
impose the presumptive sentence "unless, after consideration of aggravating or
28
mitigating factors, or both, he decides to impose a longer or shorter term."1
The judge found one aggravating factor:
10. Id. at 570-71, 364 S.E.2d at 373-74.
11. Id. at 571, 364 S.E.2d at 374.
12. Id.
13. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 2, Vandiver (1988) (No. 91A87).
14. Id.
15.

Vandiver, 321 N.C. at 571, 364 S.E.2d at 374.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 4.
19. Vandiver, 321 N.C. at 571, 364 S.E.2d at 374.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 5.
23. Vandiver, 321 N.C. at 574, 364 S.E.2d at 374.
24. Id.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1988).
26. Id. § 15A-1340.4(f)(1) (1988).
27. An Act to Establish a Fair Sentencing System in North Carolina Criminal Courts, ch. 760,
1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 1st Sess. 850 (codified as amended in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT.
chs. 14, 15 & 15A (1983, 1986, 1988 & Supp. 1988)).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1988).
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The Defendant testified on her behalf in open court. The Defendant
testified under oath that she did not stab the victum [sic], Robert Eugene Scott, but that one Paul Hair did. That by this testimony the

Defendant did deliberately present evidence during the course of the
trial which she knew was false. That the Jury by its verdict obviously

found that the Defendant's testimony was false. This Court concludes
and finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed
29
perjury by such testimony.

In addition, the judge found one statutory mitigating factor: Vandiver's prior
criminal record consisted solely of misdemeanors punishable by less than sixty

days' imprisonment. 30 The trial judge found that the aggravating factor of
Vandiver's perjury outweighed the mitigating factor of her minimal criminal

record and sentenced her to the maximum term allowed by statute,3 1 life
32

imprisonment.
Vandiver appealed directly to the North Carolina Supreme Court, 33 alleging two errors by the trial court. 34 Vandiver's second allegation of error, the
focus of this Note, concerned the trial court's use of her alleged perjury as a
nonstatutory aggravating factor. She contended that the trial judge had erred in

finding perjury for two reasons. First, though Vandiver acknowledged that the
supreme court had approved the use of perjury as an aggravating factor in sentencing, 35 she argued that her contradicted testimony did not constitute an "extreme case" of perjury, the standard previously announced by the court.3 6 In

addition, Vandiver urged the court to find error in the trial judge's determination that the jury's guilty verdict rendered her testimony "undeniably
'37

perjured."

29. Record at 34, Vandiver (No. 91A87).
30. Vandiver, 321 N.C. at 571, 364 S.E.2d at 374.
31. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1.1(3) (1986).
32. Vandiver, 321 N.C. at 571, 364 S.E.2d at 374. For a discussion of the weighing process, see
infra note 83.
33. Vandiver was entitled to an appeal as of right on two bases. At the time of her sentencing, a
defendant who was sentenced to life imprisonment by a superior court could appeal as of right
directly to the supreme court. Act of March 29, 1967, ch. 108, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 149 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (Supp. 1988)) (amended in 1987 to limit direct appeal to
supreme court to first-degree murder convictions carrying sentence of death or life imprisonment).
In addition, a defendant may appeal of right whenever the duration of the sentence imposed exceeds
the presumptive term set by statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1444 (1988).
34. Vandiver, 321 N.C. at 571-73, 364 S.E.2d at 374-75. First, Vandiver argued that the trial
court had erred in refusing to order disclosure of a police memorandum allegedly containing inconsistent prior statements by Mrs. Haselden. The supreme court held that the trial judge did not err in
refusing disclosure because the document was only a narrative of the offense and not a statement by
a witness as required by statute. Id. at 573, 364 S.E.2d at 375 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(f)
(1988)).
35. See State v. Thompson, 310 N.C. 209, 227, 311 S.E.2d 866, 876 (1984), overruled, State v.
Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988).
36. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 9. For a discussion of the extreme-case standard, see infra
text accompanying notes 94-98.
37. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 11. The state's argument in response stressed two points.
First, the testimony of the eyewitness, Mrs. Haselden, was corroborated significantly by another
prosecution witness and was characterized as unequivocal. Brief for the State at 5-6, Vandiver (No.
91A87). In addition, the state attempted to distinguish the situation in Vandiver from previous cases
disallowing the use of perjury as an aggravating factor. Id. at 6. Specifically, the state contrasted
Vandiver's inconsistent testimony and the unequivocal nature of Mrs. Haselden's eyewitness account
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The court's response was surprising. It held that perjury by a criminal defendant no longer may be considered a nonstatutory aggravating factor in sentencing convicted felons. 38 The court criticized the standard it had developed in
State v. Thompson 39 that trial judges "should refrain from finding perjury as an
aggravating factor except in the most extreme case." 4
The Vandiver court
discounted the Thompson standard as "unworkable" and an "insufficient bulwark[ ] against misuse of the aggravating factor."'4 1 Justice Martin, writing for a
unanimous court, found it "impossible to formulate adequately concrete guidelines to prevent future erroneous findings." 4 2 With its holding in Vandiver, the
court overruled three previous cases, each less than four years old at the time of
the decision, 4 3 and North Carolina became a member of the minority ofjurisdic-

tions that refuse to recognize perjury by a criminal defendant as an aggravating
factor. 44
The issues and arguments in Vandiver are not new, but instead represent
the latest development in the centuries-old conflict over how to treat those con-

victed of crime. 45 There are basically two models of criminal sentencing available to any society: indeterminate and determinate. 46 An indeterminate system
is based on the rehabilitative model of sentencing. 47 Judges and parole boards
are granted broad discretion to individualize the correctional treatment and restraint on a convicted offender in order to effect her reformation and rehabilitawith previous cases concerning defendants' consistent testimony and unbelievable state's witnesses.
Id.
38. Vandiver, 321 N.C. at 574, 364 S.E.2d at 375.
39. 310 N.C. 209, 311 S.E.2d 866 (1984), overruled, State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364
S.E.2d 373 (1988).
40. Id. at 227, 311 S.E.2d at 876. For a discussion of Thompson, see infra notes 87-98 and
accompanying text.
41. Vandiver, 321 N.C. at 573-74, 364 S.E.2d at 375.
42. Id. at 574, 364 S.E.2d at 375.
43. See id. The three cases overruled by Vandiver are: State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341
S.E.2d 713 (1986); State v. Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 337 S.E.2d 808 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1165
(1986); State v. Thompson, 310 N.C. 209, 311 S.E.2d 866 (1984).
44. See Annotation, supra note 4, at 891.
45. For more extensive discussion of the history of criminal sentencing, see S. SHANE-DUBOW,
A. BROWN & E. OLSEN, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT,
AND EFFECT 1-12 (1985) (published as part of the National Institute of Justice series, Issues and
Practices in CriminalJustice) [hereinafter SENTENCING REFORM]; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 83-115 (1976) [hereinafter FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT]. For legislative history and an analytical overview of the
North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act, see generally S. CLARKE, FELONY SENTENCING IN NORTH
CAROLINA, 1976-1986: EFFECTS OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING LEGISLATION (1987) [hereinafter

FELONY SENTENCING]; Comment, Criminal Procedure-TheNorth CarolinaFair Sentencing Act,
60 N.C.L. REV. 631 (1982).
46. N.C. GOVERNOR'S CRIME COMM'N, TRUTH IN SENTENCING: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR 6 (1987) [hereinafter TRUTH IN SENTENCING].
47. Id. "The ultimate rationale of rehabilitation is that through supervision, control and treatment the criminal justice system will do something to, for or with the defendant so that when the
person's sentence is completed ... the defendant ... will thereafter obey, not disobey, the law." J.
BURNS & J. MATTINA, SENTENCING 3-4 (1978). In essence, the rehabilitative model seeks to diminish the criminal's need or desire to commit future criminal acts. See FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 45, at 69.
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tion. 4 8 The legislature provides few, if any, criteria to determine appropriate
sentences, 49 but relies instead on judges and correctional administrators to en50
sure that "the punishment ... fit[s] the offender and not merely the crime."
Under a determinate sentencing structure, an individual convicted of a crime
receives a particular sentence mandated by the legislature, unless the trial judge
finds specific mitigating or aggravating factors.5 ' A determinate sentencing
structure deemphasizes the rehabilitative aspect of sentencing in favor of retribution for the crime committed 52 and deterrence through increased certainty of
imprisonment. 53 Among the other goals of a determinate sentencing structure
are a reduction in both the disparity and severity of sentences, as well as an
54
overall reduction in the number of prisoners incarcerated.
The primacy of either of these alternative models has varied over time. In
the eighteenth century, sentencing was essentially determinative in nature. 55
Types of punishment were limited and generally fixed by statute.5 6 For example, the English criminal code at the close of the eighteenth century contained
over 200 mandatory capital offenses, ranging from murder to cutting a tree on
another's property. 57 The nineteenth century, however, was marked by movement toward a system of indeterminate sentencing.5 8 The increase in prison
populations led to the use of alternative correctional measures such as probation,
good time, 59 and parole, which in turn led to an increasingly indeterminate system.60 In addition, intellectual support grew for a sentencing system that emphasized rehabilitation rather than punishment of criminals. 6 1 By the middle of
the twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court could safely state that
"[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal
'62
jurisprudence."
The indeterminate sentencing structure, with its avowed objective of rehabilitating criminals, relied heavily on the ability of the trial judge and correc48. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949); FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 45, at 11; TRUTH IN SENTENCING, supra note 46, at 6.
49. See FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 45, at 11.

50. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
51. See FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 45, at 19-20.
52. TRUTH IN SENTENCING, supra note 46, at 6.
53. See FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supranote 45, at 7; C. SILBERMAN, supra note 2, at
192; J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 172-78 (1975).
54. See SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 45, at 9; TRUTH IN SENTENCING, supra note 46, at
6.
55. See FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 45, at 84.
56. See FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 45, at 84.
57. SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 45, at 1.
58. SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 45, at 4.
59. Good time is the reduction of a prisoner's sentence for a period of confinement during
which he commits no disciplinary infractions. A more recent development is gain time, a process by
which a prisoner's sentence is reduced based on "the amount of the inmate's assigned work or program participation." FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 45, at 4.
60. See SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 45, at 4-6.
61. FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 45, at 93-95.
62. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
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tional officials to determine the appropriate treatment for an, offender. Critical to

this process of individualized punishment was the trial judge's possession "of the
fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics."'63 A judge should be "largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come." 64 His inquiry

should not be hindered by "restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to
'65
the trial."
It was during this period of virtually unrestricted judicial discretion in the
use of information for sentencing purposes that the United States Supreme
Court decided United States v. Grayson.66 In Grayson the Court held that a
sentencing judge may consider the perjury of a criminal defendant to evaluate
accurately the offender's "prospects for rehabilitation and restoration to a useful
place in society." 67 The Court reasoned that perjury by a criminal defendant is
"probative of his attitudes toward society and prospects for rehabilitation and
hence relevant to sentencing." 68 Readiness to lie under oath at trial is "'among
the more precise and concrete ...indicia'" available to the sentencing judge as
he attempts the difficult task of appraising the defendant's character. 69 The
Court concluded that consideration of a defendant's perjury is proper and even
70
necessary to rational determination of appropriate, individualized punishment.

Grayson was not without its dissenters. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, submitted a well-reasoned dissent that raised two primary objections. First, increasing an offender's sentence because the trial judge
71
believes he has not testified truthfully imposes a penalty without due process.
In addition, such a penalty will serve to inhibit the criminal defendant's consti63. Id. at 247 (footnote omitted).
64. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972).
65. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
66. 438 U.S. 41 (1978). Grayson began as a federal criminal trial for prison escape. At trial, the
defendant testified in his own defense. Defendant's testimony was impeached on cross-examination
by the government and contradicted by rebuttal evidence. Id. at 42-43. The jury delivered a verdict
of guilty, and the trial judge stated at the sentencing hearing that "it is my view that your defense
was a complete fabrication without the slightest merit whatsoever. I feel it is proper for me to
consider that fact in the sentencing, and I will do so." Id. at 44. Defendant appealed, claiming two
errors by the trial court. First, he argued that his sentence amounted to punishment for perjury, a
crime for which he had not been convicted. Also, defendant contended that allowing consideration
of a criminal defendant's perjury in sentencing would chill the right to testify in one's own defense.
Id. at 52.
67. Id. at 55. The Court adopted a four-part restriction on the trial judge's use of perjury as an
aggravating factor. First, the defendant's statement must be willful. Id. Next, the statement must
be a material falsehood. Id. In addition, the perjury must be assessed "in light of all the other
knowledge gained about the defendant." Id. Finally, the perjury may be used only as an indicator of
rehabilitative potential. Id.
68. Id. at 50.
69. Id. at 51 (quoting United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (2d Cir. 1974) (Frankel,
J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975)). Judge Frankel is the author of a frequently cited book on
criminal sentencing policies. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
(1973).
70. See Grayson, 438 U.S. at 53.
71. See id. at 55-56 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). A judge who increases the severity of a sentence
because he suspects that the defendant has committed perjury arguably punishes the defendant for a
crime "for which he has not been indicted, tried, or convicted by due process." Id. at 53.
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tutional right to testify in his own behalf. 72 Chief Justice Burger's majority
opinion addressed both points. The due process rights of a defendant are not
violated when a sentencing judge uses his first-hand observations of conduct and
testimony at trial to tailor the sentence to the defendant after conviction.73 Furthermore, the criminal defendant's right to testify is narrowly limited to "the
right to testify truthfully in accordance with the oath ....There is no protected
right to commit perjury." 74 Grayson continues to stand as good constitutional
law today.
Even as Grayson was being decided, criticism of the indeterminate sentencing structure was growing in response to observations of the failure of rehabilitation and severe disparities in sentence length for similar offenses. 75 These
criticisms were exacerbated in North Carolina by concern over the growing
prison population.7 6 The North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act was enacted in
1978 "to reduce unjustified variation in sentences for felonies and to make such
sentences, as well as time actually served in prison, more predictable. '77 It eliminated North Carolina's prior indeterminate sentencing law by providing presumptive sentences for most felonies, reducing parole release and supervision
78
programs, and creating a statutory good-time program for inmates.
The Fair Sentencing Act, however, did not create a purely determinative
sentencing structure. A judge may impose a sentence longer or shorter than the
presumptive sentence after considering aggravating or mitigating factors.7 9 The
statute sets out sixteen aggravating and fifteen mitigating factors that a judge
must consider before imposing a sentence.8 0 In addition, the sentencing judge
"may consider any aggravating and mitigating factors that he finds are proved
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id. at 56 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
See id. at 53-54.
Id. at 54.
See SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 45, at 6-7.
FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 45, at 1.

77.

FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 45, at 3.

78. TRUTH IN SENTENCING, supranote 46, at 7. Presumptive sentencing is the name given to a
system of criminal sentencing in which "a finding of guilty of committing a crime would predictably
incur a particular sentence unless specific mitigating or aggravating factors are established." FAIR
AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 45, at 19-20.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1988).
80. Id. The statutory factors are set out in section 15A-1340.4(a), as follows:
(1) Aggravating factors:
a. The defendant induced others to participate in the commission of the offense or
occupied a position of leadership or dominance of other participants.
b. The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
c. The defendant was hired or paid to commit the offense.
d. The offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
e. The offense was committed against a present or former law enforcement officer,
employee of the Department of Correction, jailer, fireman, emergency medical technician,
ambulance attendant, justice or judge, clerk or assistant or deputy clerk of court, magistrate, prosecutor, juror, or witness against the defendant, while engaged in the performance
of his official duties or because of the exercise of his official duties.
f. The offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
g. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by
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by the preponderance of the evidence, and that are reasonably related to the
purposes of sentencing." 81 The purposes of sentencing also are defined by
statute:
means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than
one person.
h. The defendant held public office at the time of the offense and the offense related
to the conduct of the office.
i. The defendant was armed with or used a deadly weapon at the time of the crime.
j. The victim was very young, or very old, or mentally or physically infirm.
k. The defendant committed the offense while on pretrial release on another felony
charge.
1. The defendant involved a person under the age of 16 in the commission of the
crime.
m. The offense involved an attempted or actual taking of property of great monetary
value or damage causing great monetary loss, or the offense involved an unusually large
quantity of contraband.
n. The defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the
offense.
o. The defendant has a prior conviction or convictions for criminal offenses punishable by more than 60 days' confinement. Such convictions include those occurring in
North Carolina courts and courts of other states, the District of Columbia, and the United
States, provided that any crime for which the defendant was convicted in a jurisdiction
other than North Carolina would have been a crime if committed in this State. Such prior
convictions do not include any crime that is joinable, under G.S. Chapter 15A, with the
crime or crimes for which the defendant is currently being sentenced.
p. The offense involved the sale or delivery of a controlled substance to a minor.
(2)

Mitigating factors:
a. The defendant has no record of criminal convictions or a record consisting solely
of misdemeanors punishable by not more than 60 days' imprisonment.
b. The defendant committed the offense under duress, coercion, threat, or compulsion which was insufficient to constitute a defense but significantly reduced his culpability.
c. The defendant was a passive participant or played a minor role in the commission
of the offense.
d. The defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition that was insufficient to constitute a defense but significantly reduced his culpability for the offense.
e. The defendant's immaturity or his limited mental capability at the time of commission of the offense significantly reduced his culpability for the offense.
f. The defendant has made substantial or full restitution to the victim.
g. The victim was more than 16 years of age and was a voluntary participant in the
defendant's conduct or consented to it.
h. The defendant aided in the apprehension of another felon or testified truthfully on
behalf of the prosecution in another prosecution of a felony.
i. The defendant acted under strong provocation, or the relationship between the
defendant and the victim was otherwise extenuating.
j. The defendant could not reasonably foresee that his conduct would cause or
threaten serious bodily harm or fear, or the defendant exercised caution to avoid such
consequences.
k. The defendant reasonably believed that his conduct was legal.
I. Prior to arrest at an early stage of the criminal process, the defendant voluntarily
acknowledged wrongdoing in connection with the offense to a law enforcement officer.
m. The defendant has been a person of good character or has had a good reputation
in the community in which he lives.
n. The defendant is a minor and has reliable supervision available.
o. The defendant has been honorably discharged from the United States armed
services.
Id.
81. Id. (emphasis added). This provision has been interpreted to allow the trial judge to consider factors in aggravation and mitigation that are not expressly listed in the statute. See State v.
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The primary purposes of sentencing a person convicted of a crime are
to impose a punishment commensurate with the injury the offense has
caused, taking into account factors that may diminish or increase the
offender's culpability; to protect the public by restraining offenders; to
assist the offender toward rehabilitation and restoration to the community as a lawful citizen; and to provide a general deterrent to criminal
82
behavior.
If the trial judge uses either statutory or nonstatutory factors to impose a sentence other than the presumptive term of imprisonment, he must make specific
findings in the record of those factors that are supported by a preponderance of
83
the evidence.
In light of these statutory provisions, it is clear that the Fair Sentencing Act
did not remove all discretion from trial judges in determining appropriate
sentences. 8 4 The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that the Act "is an
attempt to strike a balance between the inflexibility of a presumptive sentence
... and the flexibility of permitting punishment to be adapted, when appropriate, to the particular offender." 85 To strike that balance, the Act promotes both
86
retribution and rehabilitation.
In State v. Thompson 8 7 the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Grayson and allowed trial
judges to consider a defendant's perjury as a nonstatutory aggravating factor
relevant to sentencing.88 The Thompson court held:
As long as the sentence is not increased to punish the perjury itself and
the perceived perjury is being treated as only a factor to be weighed, we
can find nothing in our statute which would preclude the use of perjury
as an aggravating factor, provided, of course, it is proved by a prepon89
derance of the evidence.
The court reasoned that lying under oath "often indicates a defendant's continued defiance of society's system of laws." 90 The court held that because such an
Setzer, 61 N.C. App. 500, 504-05, 301 S.E.2d 107, 110, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 680, 304 S.E.2d
760 (1983). These factors often are called nonstatutory, and this Note follows that convention.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.3 (1988).
83. Id. § 15A-1340.4(b). These findings are entered on a pre-printed worksheet provided by the
Administrative Office of the Courts. To justify imposition of a sentence greater than the presumptive
term, the trial judge must find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. Id. She
may find "that one factor in aggravation outweighs more than one factor in mitigation and vice
versa .... 'The discretionary task of weighing.., factors is not a simple matter of mathematics.'"
State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 597, 300 S.E.2d 689, 697 (1983) (quoting State v. Davis, 58 N.C.
App. 330, 333, 293 S.E.2d 658, 661, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 745, 295 S.E.2d 482 (1982)).
84. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 596, 300 S.E.2d at 697.
85. Id. at 596, 300 S.E.2d at 696.
86. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.3 (1988).
87. 310 N.C. 209, 311 S.E.2d 866 (1984), overruled, State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364
S.E.2d 373 (1988). Thompson concerned a defendant charged with armed robbery who testified in his
own defense. His testimony consisted of an alibi defense that he was not in the state when the crime
was committed. The testimony contained numerous inconsistencies, and Thompson ultimately was
convicted. Id. at 223, 311 S.E.2d at 874.
88. For a discussion of Grayson, see supra notes 66-74.
89. Thompson, 310 N.C. at 221, 311 S.E.2d at 873.
90. Id. at 222, 311 S.E.2d at 873.
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attitude adversely reflects on an offender's rehabilitative potential, 91 which itself

is a valid factor to be considered in sentencing, 92 perjury is "reasonably related

to the purposes of sentencing," as required of all nonstatutory aggravating fac-

93
tors that the sentencing judge may consider.

The Thompson court acknowledged the problems inherent in the use of per-

jury as an aggravating factor. To minimize these dangers, the court insisted on
several restrictions on judicial use of the perjury factor. First, as required by
statute, 94 the sentencing judge must be convinced by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant has committed perjury. 95 Next, the judge must
make findings on the record to ensure reviewability in the event the sentence
imposed is greater than the presumptive sentence. 96 Finally, the court specifically stated that it "[did] not encourage the use of such perjury to enhance a
defendant's sentence." '97 It should be used with "extreme caution" and only "in
98
the most extreme case."2
In State v. Vandiver9 9 the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled

Thompson and held that "perjury may no longer constitute a nonstatutory aggravating factor in North Carolina."'' 10 The court's reasoning was concise, and
relied on two points.10 1 First, the court described the "extreme case" standard

established in Thompson as unworkable and susceptible to misuse.' 0 2 In addition, the court found it impossible to create an adequate standard to prevent
abuse by trial judges.' 0 3 Vandiver places North Carolina in the minority of jurisdictions that prohibit the use of a criminal defendant's perjury as an aggravat-

ing factor in sentencing.1 °4

91. Id.
92. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.3 (1988).
93. Thompson, 310 N.C. at 222, 311 S.E.2d at 873-74 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A1340.4(a) (1988)).
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1988).
95. Thompson, 310 N.C. at 221, 311 S.E.2d at 873.
96. Id. at 225, 311 S.E.2d at 875; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1444(a)(1) (1988) (appeal of
right when sentence imposed exceeds presumptive term set by statute).
97. Thompson, 310 N.C. at 226, 311 S.E.2d at 876.
98. Id. at 227, 311 S.E.2d at 876.
99. 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988).
100. Id. at 574, 364 S.E.2d at 375.
101. More significant, perhaps, is the reasoning not used by the Vandiver court. The court did
not rely upon a due process, fifth, or sixth amendment rationale, as have other jurisdictions that
reject the use of perjury as an aggravating factor in sentencing. See, eg., Beauvais v. State, 475 So.
2d 1342, 1343-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Instead, the Vandiver court rested its holding on the
need to avoid judicial subjectivity and "the interests of justice." Vandiver, 321 N.C. at 574, 364
S.E.2d at 375.
102. Vandiver, 321 N.C. at 573-74, 364 S.E.2d at 375.
103. Id. at 574, 364 S.E.2d at 375.
104. See Annotation, supra note 4, at 892-95. There are three primary reasons offered by those
jurisdictions that do not allow the use of suspected perjury as an aggravating factor. First, increasing a defendant's sentence because she is believed to have committed perjury is equivalent to punishing her for a crime for which she has not been indicted, tried, or convicted. Next, such a practice
discourages criminal defendants from exercising their constitutional right to testify in their own
defense. Also, a number of jurisdictions hold that the use of perjury in sentencing works as a disincentive to the defendant's right to plead not guilty and to demand a trial. See, eg., Beauvais, 475 So.
2d at 1344.
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Three considerations point to the conclusion that the North Carolina
Supreme Court erred in holding as it did in Vandiver. First, the court significantly overstated the Thompson standard's unworkability and potential for
abuse. In addition, the court's holding is inconsistent with the sentencing philosophy contained in the North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act. Finally, the court
vastly understated its own abilities when it found it impossible to formulate a
more useful standard to govern the use of perjury as an aggravating factor.
Justice Martin, writing for the court in Vandiver, stated that "[e]xperience
has demonstrated that the concerns expressed in Thompson were well-founded.
The 'extreme case' standard has proved unworkable and our words of caution
insufficient bulwarks against misuse of the aggravating factor." 105 This language does not accurately describe the reality of the Thompson standard as applied by the trial courts of North Carolina.
First, the Vandiver court exaggerated the actual use of nonstatutory aggravating factors, including perjury. It is true that the number of sentences that are
greater than the presumptive term outnumber those that are below it.106 In
addition, the number of felony sentences that are above the presumptive term
has increased by more than fifty percent since 1981.107 These developments
could indicate an overzealousness on the part of trial judges in the application of
aggravating factors generally, but do not necessarily indicate that any particular
nonstatutory factor is responsible. Actually, sentencing judges seldom find nonstatutory aggravating or mitigating factors at all.10 8 This indicates that the disproportionate number of sentences above the presumptive term and the
increasing frequency with which they are imposed are largely the result of statutory rather than nonstatutory aggravating factors.
It seems that if the Thompson court's concerns were well founded and its
standard unworkable, as the Vandiver court maintained, then a great number of
cases questioning the use of perjury as a nonstatutory aggravating factor would
have found their way to the supreme court. This has not been the case. Since
the court's decision in Thompson, only two cases have been appealed on the
ground that perjury was used improperly as an aggravating factor.' 0 9 In addition, the supreme court found only one of those two cases to constitute an improper use of perjury as an aggravating factor. 0
In State v. Rogers" 'I the supreme court held that the trial court had applied
105. Vandiver, 321 N.C. at 573-74, 364 S.E.2d at 375. For a discussion of the Thompson extreme
case standard, see supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
106. FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 45, at 13. For example, in 1985-86, 53% of sentences for
most felonies were above the presumptive term, while only 10% were below it. Id. at Figure 23.
107. FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 45, at 14. In 1981-82, 35% of felony sentences examined
were found to be greater than the presumptive term. In 1985-86, the percentage had grown to 53%.
Id. at 14 & Figure 23.
108. FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 45, at 5.
109. See State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled, State v. Vandiver, 321
N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 337 S.E.2d 808 (1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1165 (1986), overruled, State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988).
110. See Rogers, 316 N.C. at 232, 341 S.E.2d at 730.
111. 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled, State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364
S.E.2d 373 (1988). Rogers dealt with a trial on charges of first-degree murder and assault with a
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the Thompson standard improperly in finding perjury an aggravating factor.1 12
The court stated that "under Thompson the witness's testimony must be undeniably perjured" and refused to find that mere conflict with the state's version of
the facts, combined with otherwise intrinsically consistent testimony by the defendant, met this standard.113 In addition, the court emphasized the poor quality of the testimony offered by the state's witness1 14 and resisted the notion that
a guilty verdict by a jury hearing defendant's own testimony compels a finding of
115
perjury.
A further example of the application of the Thompson standard is found in
State v. Brown.1 16 In Brown, defendant testified on his own behalf and offered
an alternative chronology of events to that offered by the state in his trial for the
armed robbery and first-degree murder of a convenience store clerk. In addition, he denied making a limited confession to the police on the day of the crime.
Finally, he admitted having several felony convictions, including one for the
shooting of a police officer in Virginia that resulted in the officer's paralysis, but
denied actually committing any of the offenses. 117 The state offered evidence of
the defendant's confession, his prior convictions and, most dramatically, secured
the in-person testimony of the police officer Brown was convicted of shooting. 118
The court reiterated its warning that "trial judges should exercise extreme caution in this area and refrain from finding perjury as an aggravating factor except
in the most egregious cases." 119 Nevertheless, the court sustained the trial
court's finding of perjury by a preponderance of evidence, making clear that
deadly weapon with intent to kill. The co-defendant, Belinda Carraway, testified that the victim was
shot in self-defense. The trial judge found that the jury, by convicting Carraway, disbelieved her
testimony. The court then "likewise finds she committed perjury." Id. at 231-32, 341 S.E.2d at 730.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 232, 341 S.E.2d at 730 (emphasis added).
114. Id. ("testimony reeked of inconsistencies, contradictions, and recantations").
115. Id. The verdict, without more, does not authorize a finding of perjury. "In a prosecution
for pejury it is required that the falsity of the oath be established by the testimony of two witnesses,
or by one witness and corroborating circumstances sufficient to turn the scales against the defendant's oath." State v. Wilson, 30 N.C. App. 149, 153, 226 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1976) (citing State v.
Sailor, 240 N.C. 113, 115, 81 S.E.2d 191, 192 (1954)). The jury may find a defendant's testimony
irrelevant to the issue of his guilt or innocence. Alternatively, the jury may believe the defendant's
testimony, but still find that he failed to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Also, the defendant
may testify truthfully in an effort to establish an affirmative defense, but ultimately fail to establish
the defense for lack of some required element. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 57 n.4
(1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Finally, "some essential elements of proof of criminal conduct, such
as knowledge, intent, malice, and premeditation are sometimes so subjective that testimony about
them cannot be readily categorized as true or false." United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284, 1287-88
(4th Cir. 1973). Jurisdictions that allow the use of suspected perjury as an aggravating factor in
sentencing attempt to control these possibilities by requiring that the sentencing authority find that
the defendant's testimony "contained willful and material falsehoods," Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55, or
that "the verdict of guilt must necessarily establish that the defendant lied, not merely that the jury
did not believe his testimony." Commonwealth v. Thurmond, 268 Pa. Super. 283, 288, 407 A.2d
1357, 1359 (1979).
116. 315 N.C. 40, 337 S.E.2d 808 (1985), cert. denied,, 476 U.S. 1165 (1986), overruled, State v.
Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988).
117. Id. at 47, 337 S.E.2d at 816.
118. Id. at 47-48, 337 S.E.2d at 816.
119. Id. at 69, 337 S.E.2d at 828. The court referred to its similar warning in Thompson. Id.;
see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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Brown was an example of an egregious case.1 20 Careful review of the case law in
this area thus tends to repudiate the Vandiver court's view of the standard as
unworkable or prone to misuse. If such were the case, then the argument undoubtedly would have been made by the Vandiver defendant. Both at trial and
on appeal, however, defendant argued only that her testimony failed to rise to
12 1
the level of undeniably perjured.
Such an example of judicial activism is inconsistent with prior case law
regarding appellate review of sentencing decisions. Ironically, none other than
Justice (then Judge) Martin once wrote:
Judges still have discretion to increase or reduce sentences from the
presumptive term upon findings of aggravating or mitigating factors,
the weighing of which is a matter within their sound discretion....
The balance struck by the trial judge will not
be disturbed if there
122
is support in the record for his determination.
Even if the court had exercised the restraint counseled by then-Judge Martin, it
may have been able to achieve the same result obtained in Vandiver without
overruling Thompson. Defendant argued that the facts surrounding her testimony were more comparable with those of Rogers, in which the court refused to
sustain the use of perjury as an aggravating factor. 123 As in Rogers, Vandiver
arguably offered consistent testimony as to the events leading up to the stabbing.
In addition, Mrs. Haselden, the state's only eyewitness, was taking medication at
the time she allegedly saw defendant stab Scott.1 24 The remainder of the testimony by the state's witnesses contained various inconsistencies as well. 125 It is
conceivable that the Vandiver court could have reached the same result while
observing stare decisis had it simply adopted defendant's arguments on
appeal.126
The court's holding prohibiting the use of perjury as a nonstatutory aggra-

vating factor arguably is inconsistent with the North Carolina Fair Sentencing
Act. At first glance, the Act, with its presumptive sentences, reduced parole
release and supervision, statutory good-time for inmates, and appeals of right
upon deviation from presumptive terms, appears to be a highly determinative

sentencing structure.127 The statutory scheme, however, contains many provisions that conflict with a true determinate system.1 28 The Fair Sentencing Act is
120. Id. at 68, 337 S.E.2d at 828.
121. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 8-12.
122. State v. Davis, 58 N.C. App. 330, 333-34, 293 S.E.2d 658, 661 (Martin, J.) (quoted with
approval in State v. Abeam, 307 N.C. 584, 597, 300 S.E.2d 689, 697 (1983)), disc. rev. denied, 306
N.C. 745, 295 S.E.2d 482 (1982).
123. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 11. For a discussion of Rogers, see supra notes 111-115
and accompanying text.
124. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 11.
125. See id. These discrepancies included the lighting of the murder scene, the actual movements and location of Mrs. Haselden, and her prior inconsistent statements. Id.
126. This is not to say the supreme court would have definitely reached this outcome. Vandiver
was overheard by a police officer to say, "What do you do when a white boy slaps you?" DefendantAppellant's Brief at 5.
127. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
128. For example, rehabilitation is retained as a purpose ofsentencing. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
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probably best described as a "hybrid of old and new concepts."' 129 The North
Carolina Supreme Court previously has stated,
The Fair Sentencing Act was not intended... to remove all discretion
from our able trial judges. The trial judge should be permitted wide
latitude in arriving at the truth as to the existence of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, for it is only he 3who
observes the demeanor
0
of the witnesses and hears the testimony.1
More specifically, the statute expressly empowers the sentencing judge to "consider any aggravating and mitigating factors that he finds are proved by the
preponderance of the evidence, and that are reasonably related to the purposes
3
of sentencing." 1'1
Though the statute describes sixteen aggravating and fifteen
mitigating factors the trial judge must consider, she is not in fact limited by this
enumeration. 132 The trial judge's discretion in this area is such that " '[t]here is
a presumption that the [sentencing] judgment of a court is valid and just.' "133
A holding, like Vandiver, that reins in trial judges hardly is consistent with such
common law and statutory discretion.
Courts traditionally have allowed sentencing judges to use a broad range of
information in determining an appropriate sentence for an individual, a practice
inconsistent with the restrictive holding in Vandiver. To determine an appropriate sentence, a trial judge may consider the "age, character, education, environment, habits, mentality, propensities and record of the defendant.' 1 34 The
sentencing judge is "not required to ignore the facts and evidence of the
36
case," 135 because only he observes the testimony and demeanor of witnesses.1
The trial judge also may direct that a probation officer prepare a presentence
report. 137 The probation officer is commanded by statute to investigate "all circumstances relevant to sentencing" and present his findings to the court. 138 Sentencing reports frequently contain information on the defendant's prior criminal
record and may include arrests not followed by a conviction as well as juvenile
1340.3 (1988). Plea bargains are exempted from presumptive sentences, id. § 15A-1340.4(a), as are
the most serious felonies. Id. Judges retain full discretion to suspend a sentence and place the convicted offender on probation. Id.
129. TRUTH IN SENTENCING, supra note 46, at 7; see supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
130. State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 596, 300 S.E.2d 689, 697 (1983).
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1988) (emphasis added). Both the United States and
North Carolina Supreme Courts have held that peijury by a criminal defendant is probative of rehabilitative potential. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978); State v. Thompson, 310 N.C.
209, 222, 311 S.E.2d 866, 871 (1984), overruled, State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373
(1988). Rehabilitation is still explicitly identified as a valid purpose of sentencing in North Carolina.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.3 (1988).
132. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-1340.4(a). For a complete listing of statutory aggravating and
mitigating factors, see supra note 80.
133. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 597, 300 S.E.2d at 697 (quoting State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 335, 126
S.E.2d 126, 133 (1962)).
134. State v. Morris, 60 N.C. App. 750, 754-55, 300 S.E.2d 46, 49 (1983). In North Carolina,
the rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1334(b) (1988);

N.C. R. EviD. l101(b)(3).
135.
136.
137.
138.

Morris, 60 N.C. App. at 755, 300 S.E.2d at 49.
See Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 596, 300 S.E.2d at 697.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1332(b) (1988).
Id. (emphasis added).
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adjudications. 139 Such broad access to extrajudicial information concerning the
convicted offender weighs heavily against restricting the use of what the trial
judge has seen and heard at trial. To prohibit a sentencing judge from consider-

ing a criminal defendant's perjury is analogous to putting one's "finger in the
dike," while a torrent of other extrajudicial information spills over the top of the
wal of due process.
The court's failure to promulgate a sufficiently coherent standard allowing

the use of perjury as an aggravating factor in sentencing, opting instead to prohibit its use altogether, is a third deficiency of Vandiver. Indeed, the court found

it "impossible to formulate adequately concrete guidelines to prevent future erro-

neous findings" of perjury. I4° This pronouncement is hardly credible given the

plethora of guidance in both statutes and case law in North Carolina, as well as
that found in the majority of other jurisdictions that continue to use suspected
14
perjury as an aggravating factor in sentencing. '
In applying North Carolina law, the court should have turned first to the
statutory provisions governing sentencing in state courts. For nonstatutory aggravating or mitigating factors, the statute sets out a two-part standard. First,
the factor must be "reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing."' 4 2 In

addition, the factor must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 143
Finally, the sentencing judge must "specifically list in the record each matter in
aggravation or mitigation that he finds proved by a preponderance of the evidence."' 144 This requirement discourages trial judges from considering illegitimate factors in sentencing by forcing them to articulate their reasonings. The
findings also provide a basis for appellate review of the sentence imposed by the
trial judge.
The case law refines the statutory foundation by providing guidance as to
what constitutes a preponderance of the evidence. The supreme court in State v.
Thompson 145 required "numerous discrepancies in the defendant's testimony"
to reach the evidentiary threshold.' 4 6 Thompson also instructed that sentencing
139. See DIVISION OF ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE, N.C. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS,
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE MANUAL 1-2 (1983); PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION, supra note
1, at 10-11.
140. Vandiver, 321 N.C. at 574, 364 S.E.2d at 375 (emphasis added).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 55 (1978) (federal); United States v. Warren, 13 M.J. 278, 284 (C.M.A. 1982) (military); Dymenstein v. State, 720 P.2d 42, 46 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1986); People v. Speed, 129 Ill. App. 3d 348, 349, 472 N.E.2d 572, 573-74 (1984); Common.
wealth v. Thurmond, 268 Pa. Super. 283, 287-88, 407 A.2d 1357, 1359-60 (1979); State v. Bertoldi,
495 A.2d 247, 253-54 (R.I. 1985); State v. Finley, 355 S.E.2d 47, 52 (W. Va. 1987). For a more
detailed discussion, see Annotation, supra note 4, at 890-900.
142. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1988).
143. Id.
144. Id. § 15A-1340.4(b).
145. 310 N.C. 209, -311 S.E.2d 866 (1984), overruled, State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364
S.E.2d 373 (1988).
146. Id. at 223, 311 S.E.2d at 874. Most revealing was the fact that defendant denied being in
the state for the entire month surrounding the crime. When confronted with a signed affidavit of
indigency that he had submitted in person to a clerk of court named Mrs. Wright during his alleged
absence, he responded, "I don't remember talking to no Miss Wright. I remember talking to Mrs.
Spangler." Id. at 214, 311 S.E.2d at 869.
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judges "should exercise extreme caution ... and should refrain from finding
perjury as an aggravating factor except in the most extreme case." 147 Subsequent decisions provide examples of when such extreme cases arise. 148 The case
law provides negative examples as well. Mere conflict with the state's evidence
is not sufficient to support a finding of perjury if the defendant's testimony is
otherwise consistent.149 Likewise, a verdict of guilty does not compel a finding
of perjury.150 Testimony must be found to be "undeniably perjured" to be used
as an aggravating factor. 151
A somewhat clearer formulation may be found by turning to other jurisdictions for comparison. The United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Grayson 15 2 established a four-part test for the discretionary use of perjury as an
aggravating factor. 153 A compelling formulation of the Grayson standard is
154
found in Commonwealth v. Thurmond:
First, the misstatements must be willful.... Second, the misstatement
must be material, not of marginal importance.... Third, the verdict
of guilt must necessarily establish that the defendant lied, not merely
that the jury did not believe his testimony .... Fourth, the verdict
must be supported by sufficient credible evidence .... Fifth, the trial
court, if not acting as trier of fact, must observe the testimony allegedly false .... Finally, the court may consider the155defendant's lying
only as one fact among many bearing on sentence.
In light of such well-developed alternative standards, not to mention those
within the court's jurisdiction, it is extremely difficult to believe that the North
Carolina Supreme Court could not sift and choose among them to develop a
standard of its own.
The North Carolina Supreme Court erred in its holding in Vandiver for
three reasons. First, it significantly overstated the unworkability of the existing
standard governing the use of suspected perjury by a criminal defendant as an
aggravating factor in sentencing.15 6 Next, it failed to take into account the large
amount of judicial discretion provided by statute under the Fair Sentencing
Act.157 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the court shirked its responsibil147. Id. at 227, 311 S.E.2d at 876.
148. Kg., State v. Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 68, 337 S.E.2d 808, 828 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1165 (1986), overruled, State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988). For a discussion of
Brown, see supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
149. State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 232, 341 S.E.2d 713, 730 (1986), overruled, State v.
Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988).
150. Id.; see supra note 115.
151. Rogers, 316 N.C. at 232, 341 S.E.2d at 730.
152. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
153. See supra note 67. It is interesting to note that the military has adopted a system almost
identical to that described in Grayson, but compresses it to a three-point analysis. United States v.
Warren, 13 M.J. 278, 285-86 (C.M.A. 1982). First, the court must find the accused lied under oath.
Id. at 285. Next, the falsehoods must be willful and material. Id. at 286. Finally, the perjured
testimony is considered only as it bears on the rehabilitative potential of the convicted offender. Id.
154. 268 Pa. Super. 283, 407 A.2d 1357 (1979).
155. Id. at 287-88, 407 A.2d at 1359-60.
156. See supra notes 106-26 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
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ity to its own precedent by failing to adequately consider alternatives to overruling a developed body of case law. 158 Such action, particularly in light of the
statutory framework provided by the Fair Sentencing Act, ignores stare decisis
and flies in the face of legislative intent.
Perjury by a criminal defendant should be considered as a nonstatutory
aggravating factor bearing on sentencing in North Carolina. 159 To fully answer
the concerns voiced by the supreme court in Vandiver, a restrictive framework,
such as that found in Commonwealth v. Thurmond,1 60 should be adopted. In
this way, the criminal defendant's right to testify on his own behalf will be protected and her due process rights preserved.
It has been said that "[i]n theory, the function of the courts is to determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused. Actually, it is to decide what to do with
persons whose guilt or innocence is not at issue."' 16 1 The noted scholar James Q.
1 62
By
Wilson has said that sentencing is the primary task of the court system.
moving to a more strictly presumptive system of sentencing in its decision in
Vandiver, the North Carolina Supreme Court shifts part of its "primary task" to
the legislature, and in effect "substitute[s] the capriciousness of the legislature
for the capriciousness of individual judges." 163 This can only serve to upset the
sentencing balance of power established under the North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act.
WILLIAM T. BARTO

158. See supra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
159. Alternatively, the legislature could amend the Fair Sentencing Act to add perjury by a
criminal defendant to the already existing list of 16 aggravating factors that a trial judge must consider during sentencing. No other jurisdiction has yet done so, however. Given the highly subjective
determination required of the trial judge in such a situation, it does not seem appropriate to require
him to consider perjury as an aggravating factor. A more reasonable approach, and that advocated
by this Note, is to allow him the option to do so.
160. 268 Pa. Super. 283, 407 A.2d 1357 (1979).
161. J. WILSON, supra note 53, at 163.
162. See J. WILSON, supra note 53, at 179.
163. C. SILBERMAN, supra note 2, at 294.

